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MOST FAVOURED NATION CLAUSE: MAFFEZINl AND
INTERNATIONAL

LAw COMMISSION
-Niruphama Ramakrishnan

INTRODUCTION

International law has branched out into regimes unforeseen by scholars and
practitioners a few decades back. The fragmented development of international
law in the last few decades has led to issues of coherence and pluralism. I The
development of specialized regimes has isolated the application of specific
principles and techniques of interpretation to certain regimes (such as those
in international trade law and international criminal law) in addition to a
common pool of generic principles applicable to multiple regimes (such as the
responsibility of States and International Organisations).
The International Law Commission (ILC) was set up, amongst others, to respond
to the multi-channel gtowth of international law and to provide guidance and
uniformity as and when required.' The functions oflLC in this regard include,
amongst others, the preparation of draft conventions and precise formulation and
systematization of rules of international law.' The ILC codifies legal principles
into draft articles, to the extent these are not supported by State practice or there
are gaps in the law; it engages in progressive development of the law.

ILC, Fragnuntation of Inurnational Law: Difficult;,! arising from the Diversification and
Expamion of Inurnationai iAw,REroRT OF THE STUDY GROUP OF THE I NTERNATIONAL
LAw COMMISSION AT THE 5sm SESSION 248 (1 May-9 June and 3 July-II August 2006)

UN Doc. NCN.4/L.682
2

Stacute of the ILC. art. 1 states the 'International Law Commission shall have for its
object ive the promotion of the progressive development of international law and its
codification .'

3

Id.

at

4, An 15.
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In this tenor, the ILC has studied and analysed the topic f most favo ured
nation treatment extensively from 1967 to 1978. The product of th is round of
consideration led to the codification of the topic in the for m of Draft Articles
on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, 1978.'The General Assembly of the United
Nations, however, shelved the draft articles in anticipation o f comments from
Member States and for further crystallisation of the law by , 'tate practice 5
Interestingly, subsequent ro the opinion of the Internan onal Centre for
Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID or Tribunal), the case of Emilio
Agustin Majfozini v. The Kingdom of Spain 6 has forced the ILC ro reopen the
issue in 2006. The ILC rationalizes the re-inclusion of this the me for discussion
in its report at the 64'" session of the ILC " ... overall objective ofthe [ILC] Study
Group [on the topic of MFN) is to seek to saftguard against fragmentation of

international law and to stress the importance ofgreater coherenet' in the approaches
taken in the arbitral decisions in the area of investment, particularly in relation
to MFN provisions."7
The impact of the ICSID's award to include dispute settlement clause in
the scope of the MFN clause has been discussed, agreed upon and criticised
by many scholars from rhe perspective of international investment law and
international arbitration law. This article, whilst drawing from these discussions,
will discuss the plausible role of ILC in the second round with specific focus
on the following questions: (i) Is ILC within its scope of functions to reassess
the topic pursuant to a decision from ICSID? (ii) What should the approach
of ILC be in handling the ropic of most favoured nation once again? Can it
4

ILC, YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION 8-73 (Vo l. " (2) (1 978), UN
Doc. No. NCN.4/S ER.N I978/Add.1.

5

lLC, Most-Favourtd-Nation Clauu - REpORT OF THE WORKING GROUP 7. 59th session
(7 May-8 June and 9 July-l0 August 2007) UN Doc NO. NCN .4/L.7 19.

6

Decision ofICSID on Objections to Jurisdiction of January 25, 2000, 161CSI D Rev.FILJ 212 (2001) : 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002): 124 I.L.R. 9 (2003)

7

ILC,

REpORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL

LAw

COMMISSION ON THE W ORK OF ITS 64TH

SESSION127 (7 May- l June and 2 July- 3 August 2012) UN Doc Af671l0. It further
statcs "It is considn'td that the Studl Group could malu a contributitJn towards assuring
gretlUr urtainty and stability in the Juld ofinvestment law. It saki to dllborau an outcome
that would be ofpractical utility to those invo/v(d in the investmmt field and to po/icymakas."
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contradict irself? How can it distinguish this from other topics? And, (iii) What
should the work product of the ILC be to conclude this session?
In ptoviding a brief background, the article dwells into the history and evolution
of the MFN clause, bilateral investment treaties and a bird's eye view of ILC's
study on the ropic. This is followed by a summary of the Ma./fizini decision and
the jurisprudence following it. The final section discusses ILC's parh forward
and the options available for ILC in upcoming sessions.

BRIEF HISTORY OF MFN
The MFN treatment imposes an obligation on the State towards another State
to provide fair and equal treatment to all of the latter State's nationals in the
former State's territories' The purpose is to ensure that no foreign national is
discriminated against or subject to undue disadvantage as compared to other
foreign nationals. This could also be viewed as a prohibition to confer special
favourable treatment to nationals of select foreign States on the basis of their
nationaliry to the exclusion of others."'·
The birth of this obligation is sourced differently by each organisation. The
Working Group of the ILC identifies the initial form of the clause in treaties
of friendship, commerce and navigation." The Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development, in its working paper, identifies it back at
the Twelfth Century with its first appearance as a clause in a treary in Seventh

8

GEeD, Most-Favourtd-Nation Treatment in Inurnationa/ Investmmt Law in WO RKING
PAPE RS ON I NTERNATIONAL I NVESTMENT NUMBER 2004/2 (2004); "Draft Articles on
most-favoured- nalion clauses with comme ntaries" 2 1 Article S (1978).

9

Henrik Horn and Perros C. Mavroidis, Economic and uga/ aspects of the Most-Favortd-

Nation c/auS( 17

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL EcONOMY

233-279 (2001).

10

The foreign subjects could be individuals or corporations investin g. trading or engaging
in commercial activities in the foreign State. This treatment is to be dist ingu ished from
the national treatment wherein the state panies 1O the treaty are obligated 1O treat
the foreign subjects in the same manner as their nationals. MFN is only focussed on
discrimination am ongst foreign nationals and not against foreign nationals. ILC , 'Report
of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 60th Session' 390-40 1 (S May

11

!d. at 390 (Annex B)

to

6 June and 7 July to 8 August, 2008) UN Doc N63/ 10.
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Century. 12 A similar description is provided by the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 13
The protection against discrimination was initially in relation to people involved
with commerce and navigation. Subsequently. this protection was adopted into
the International trade regime with the General Agreement ofTrade and Tariffs
and. recently. was included in investment agreements. The evolution can be
attributed ro the increased interaction between foreign individuals with State
entities and consequent operations in foreign territories.
The second debate about the history of the MFN clause is in relation to its
classification into customary law or treary-based law. With the close association
ofMFN clause with treaties through its evolution. and the fact that most of the
MFN treatment was caused due to their incorporation trea ties. it is strongly
argued that they do not fall in the category of international customary law. IS

I'

Therefore. the proponents of this argument believe that State practice should
not influence the interpretation of MFN clauses. and it should purely be on
the basis of Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties. This de ate is important
because if MFN is not a customary law. then the relevance of State practice
would be diminished gready.16 Nevertheless. it could be argued that MFN
treatment is now evolved into a custom. as its absence in a treary will rarely
induce a State from treating certain foreign nationals differently.
While ILC did not explicitly treat MFN obligation as customary law. it excluded
MFN obligation from other Laws of Treaties topic and decided to deal with it
as a separate topic. ILC separated MFN as a complex regime with a separate
12

Supra notc: 8 at 3.

13

U NCTAD , Most-Favourd Nation Trtatment, UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 119 (2010)

14

Stare practice supported by opinion juris crcates customary law and inte rn at ional
conventions expressly stating an understanding of law between parties is treaty law.
Malcolm N . Shaw, [nternational Law. page 68 -91 (5th Edition. 20( 3).

15

Papatinskis Manins. MFN CIaUSts and Int<17lational Disput, S",lcmcnt: Moving bcyond
Malfczjni andPlama?26[CSID REvIEW-FOREIGN [NVESTMENT LAw JOl'RNAL 14-20 (2011 ).
Jd; Scc aiso, Draft Article on Most Favoured Nat ion clause 1978, Article 4 at page 18. It
clarifies that it is a 'treaty provision' in the text of the Article .

16
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jurisprudence on interpretation and application. 17 It should be highlighted mat
the treaties contain ing the MFN clause continue to be interpreted on the basis
of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, i.e., by looking at the intention
and practices of the parties to the treaty at the time of entering into it, thereby
making the distinction only a matter of convenience. 18

GAIT and MFN Obligation
The cornerstone ofMFN jurisprudence recently has been me General Agreement
of Trade and Tariffs." It codifies me MFN obligations and prioriti= it as one
of the twO foundational non-discrimination principles of me trade regime. 2•
The impact on international trade due to me mandatory MFN obligation in
a multilateral treaty was so significant mat WIO included vital MFN clauses
in most of its agreements. Prior to GAIT, two types of MFN clauses existed conditional (me State taking on me obligation would agree to treat me nationals
of me contracting State in an equal manner for a quidpro quo) and unconditional
MFN (where me treatment was without any return favour)." However, GAIT
removed the concept of conditional MFN treatment, expressly making the
treatment to be imposed" immediately and unconditionally."22

17

"In considering the relationship becwecn the most-Favoured-nation clause and the

differem levds of economic development, the Commission found that the operation of
the clause in the sphere of economic relations, ... was not a maner that lem itself easily
codification of imernationaI law in the sense in which that term was used in article
15 of the Statute of the Commission, because ... extensive State practice, precedents and
doctrine , were not easily discernible." Supra note 4 at 13.
[0

18

It should be noted that prior to the Vienna Conventio n on the Law of Treaties (VCLn,
MFN clause was interpreted by the IC) in Amabatielos Case (Greece v. United Kingdom)

I.C]. Plead ings, Oral Pleadings, at 457 (Mar. 28, 1953) and Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (UK
v. Iran) , 1952I.C]. Rep. 93,109 Ouly 22). Despite having been interpreted in the preVCLT regime, they continue to be consistent with some of the post-VCLT cases.

19

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. 1, (1994)

20

Supra note 9.
Draft Article on Most Favoured Nation clause, art. 11 ,12 and 13 (I 978); Another typology

21

of MFN clauses that impose unilateral obligations on only one of the parties and those
which impose bilateral or mult ilateral obligations on all parties to the treaty.

22

One of the options for ILC is to gene rate a model clause and recommend a multilateral
treaty amongst all parties to avoid any variance for the investment regime, similar to the

GATT regime.
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BIlATERAL AND MULTIlATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
The inclusion of MFN obligation in a bilateral investme t treaty" (BITs)
is reasonably intuitive. A BIT is one of the chief modes of allowing foreign
investment into the markets of a State." As the move me t of liquid funds
increased, the number of BITs entered into by countries increased. The MFN
treatment was included in BITs to ensure that 'an investor ftom a parry to
an agreement, or its investment, would be treated by the other parry "no less
favourably" with respect to a given subject matter than an investor fro m any
third country or its investment.''' However, the parties to each BIT are different,
and, consequently, the language used in the MFN clause varies greatly from
one BIT to another.'· Further, the authorities interpreting and settli ng the
disputes arising from these treaties are several as well, and each of them, while
still trying to be consistent, stress on different aspects of the interpretation.2l
This has generated a pool of interpretations and exceptions on the scope of
the MFN clause. This variation is the root cause of the present issue at hand.

23

UNCfAD defines a BIT [0 be "agreements between [wo countries for the reciprocal
encouragement. promotion and protection of investmems in each other's territories
by companies based in ei ther country. A BIT rypica1ly covers sco pe and definicio n of
investment. adm ission and establishment. national treatment, most-Favoured- nation
treatment, fair and equitable treatment, compensation in the event of expropriation or
damage to the investment, guarantees of free transfers of funds, and dispute settlement
mechanisms. both state-state and investor-state," Definition of BIT as provided by

24

Stephanie L. Parker, A BfT at a Time: The Proper Extension ofthe MFN Clause to Dispute
Stttiement Provisions in Bilattrallnvtstment Trtatits, 30-63 THE ARB ITRATION BRIEF 2,
No. I (2012).

25

Supra note 8.

26

The article discusses four broad categories ofMFN clauses, namely, dauses th at explicitly
affi rm appli cation to dispute settlement provisions, broad clauses without express mention
of dispute settlement provisions, narrow clauses [hat make no specific reference to dispute
seniemem provisions, and clauses expressly prohibit application to dispute settlement
provisions. Supra note 22.

UNCfAD available at http://www.unctadxi.orghemplates/Page I (JOG.aspx

27

There are cases which deal with same issue on the scope of the MFN clause decided by
d ifferent courts reaching different conclusions. Some examples of ~uch cases are Anglo
Iranian case decided by the International Court of Justice , Ambacieios case (Greece

v. United Kingdom) decided by the Arbitration Commission 2 March 195G (I95G
Inrernational Law Reports 30G) and Maffezi ni case decided by ICS IO.
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ILC AND MFN - PART ONE
Pursuant to completion of its work on the topic of law treaties, the ILC
embarked on the project to study the MFN clause as a topic for its consideration
in 1968." This was in response to the great interest expressed by Member States
on the topic, and the ILC aimed to produce materials on the topic that might
be of assistance to UNCITRAL. 29 The lLC categorically refused to limit the
topic to the trade law regime and "considered that it should focus on the legal
character of the ckIuse and on the legal conditions governing its application and
that it should ckIrifj the scope and effect of the ckIuse as a legal institution in the
context ofall aspects ofits practical application.'30
In 1976, after completing the first reading of the draft articles, the ILC decided
to present the draft articles to the General Assembly, and collected comments
from Member States and organizations." In 1978, the ILC submitted the
final set of draft articles with commentaries to the General Assembly which,
in rum, presented the draft articles to the Member States and organizations
for comments." This invitation to the Member States was renewed in the
subsequent sessions, until the 46"' session in 1991. 33 At this session, the General
28

G.A. Res. 272 (XXII), 22nd Session (1967), REpORT OF THE INT ERNATIONAL LAw
COMMISSION, UN Doc. No. AlRES/2272(XXI I).

29

The wpic was originally proposed by Jiminez de Arechaga to be included in the law of
treaties as an excepti on

[0

the provision relating to impact of treaties on third parties. As

mentioned earlier in this article, ILC felt thal the provisional articles on law of treaties
would not impact the scope of the MFN clause despite being included in several trealies.
The topic was saved ro be considered separately in due course of time. ILC, YEARBOOK

30
31

OF INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION 165-66 (1968) (Pan Two) UN Doc No. AI
CN.4 /L.l27.
Supra note 2 aI 8.
At the first reading, so me of the main considerations were that the draft articles did
nO{ provide any exception for the custom union, free trade agreements and econom ic
partnership agreements. This specificall y affected developing count ries which were
engaged in regional free trade agreements and enjoyed preferential treatment from certaln

contracting states. This was further reflected in the draft Article by the indusion of Article
23 to Article 26. Further, the issue of dispute settlement for MFN clause was discussed
extensively.

32
33

G.A. Res. 33/1 39, 33'" session (1978), Resolution 331139 Report of the International
Law Co mmission, UN Doc. AlRES/331139
UN GENERAL AsSEMBLY, YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 167 (Vol. 45, 1991 ).
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Assembly, considering the recent developments and rapid growth in the area,
decided to let the draft articles as guidance for future decisions by Member
States and organizations.
The primary articles relevant for this paper are Anicles 9 and 10 of the Draft Anicles
on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, 1978. Article 9 and 10 elaborate upon the scope
of the MFN clause based on the subject matter test - the subject matter being what
constitutes the rights involved and who are the benefidaries. This encompasses
the ejusdem generis doctrine which literally translates into 'of the same kind.'''' The
beneficiary of the MFN is the Stare, and accordingly, Anicle 9 clarifies that the
beneficiary State can acquire the most favourable treatment only in relation to the
rights which are envisaged by the clause or similar rights. Also, It can be acquired
only for persons or things implied or specified in the subject matter of the clause."
This is extended by Article 10 ro state that a beneficiary State of a MFN clause
can assert its rights only in respect of those rights vested on the third parties
who are dealing with the same subject matter as the MFN cla.use.'" Therefore,
reading these two articles together, the rights envisaged under Article 10 can
be seen as a subset of those envisaged under Article 9.
One of the main worries of some of the Member States was the possibil iry of
lack of uniformity in the interpretation of the rules determining the scope of
the MFN clause. These States felt the need to have a settlement procedure and
rules to 'avoid disintegration of carefully negotiated' terms, w ich will provide
balanced protection of competing interests."
The ILC clarifies that the scope of the draft articles is clarified by ILC ro be
an auronomous body of rules and not an annex to the Vien a Convention. 38

35
36

According to this principle. if the MFN clause is in relation to a treaty governing trade of
computer goods. the interpretation cannot be utilized by an individual throuclt another treaty
governing trading in precious gems. The subject maner of the treaties shoukt be the same.
Draft Articles on the mOSt favored nation clause, Article 9.
Jd Art. 10.

37
38

Supra note 4 at 30.
Supra note 4 at 14.

34
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However, in relation to the inclusion of a dispute settlement clause for
the interpretation and application of the MFN clause, special rapporteur,
EndreUstor, in his seventh report states that "as the articles on the mostFavoured-nation clause are conceived as a supplement to the Vienna Convention,
the relevant provisions of that Convention will also apply when a dispute arises
in connexion with a most-favoured nation clause,"39
Further, the second special rapporteur, Nikolai A. Ushakov, opines that the
dispute settlement provision in the draft articles can only serve as a source of
information on the substance and legal consequence of the clauses discussed
and can be overridden by any other dispute settlement procedure provided for
in the treaties themselves'Q

MAFFEZINI AND ITS IMPACT
The case of Emilio Agustin Majfezini v. The Kingdom o/Spain'l arises ftom an
investment made by Emilio A. Maffezini, an Argentinian national, in Emilio A.
Maffezini S. A. (EAMSA), a corporation incorporated under the laws of Spain.
EAMSA was largely held by Maffezini, and the rest was held by SODIGA, an
entity adjudged by ICSID to be an entity of the State, i.e., Kingdom ofSpain.42
As the project proceeded, Maffezini invested more money in EAMSA, including
a loan for 30 million Spanish Pesetas from his personal account in 1992.
When the project's expenses exceeded prior estimation, Maffezini called
off the project and offered to buyout the property from SODIGA for the
amount already paid to EAMSA. SODIGA proposed a counter-offer seeking
for Maffezini to make additional payment to buy the property. But, pursuant
39

UN , YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION 155 (vo l I, 1976) UN Doc. No.
NCN.4/SER.Al1976. Supra note 37 at 134.

40

Jd

41

Decision oflCSID on Objections to Jurisdiction ofJanuary 25, 2000, 16 ICSID Rev.FILJ 212 (2001); 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002); 124 I.L.R. 9 (2003)

42

ld. Also m paragraphs Award of the Tribunal of November 13, 2000, 16 ICSID REv.FILJ 248 (2001); 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002); 124 I.L.R. 35 (2003) - The court applies
the structural and functional paragraph 46 to 57. The court discussed attribution of the
acts of SO DIG A to the Kingdom of Spain.
121
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to negotiations, SODIGA re-offered to sell the property to Maffezini for
the amount already paid. At this stage, Maffezini approached ICSID for the
settlement of the dispute." The Tribunal first considered the j risdictional issues
raised by Spain in irs decision delivered on January 25,2000. and subsequently
considered the dispute on merits and delivered its award on November 13,
2000. This article will be focussing on the decision ofJanualY 2000 discussing
the scope of the most fovoured nation clause in bilateral investment treaties
between States.
Maffezini approached the Tribunal by invoking the bilateral investment treaty
between Argentina and Spain (the "Argentina-Spain BIT") . Spain challenged
the jurisdiction on the grounds that the settlement of d spures under the
Argentina-Spain BIT should be conducted in accordance with clauses (2), (3)
and (4) of Article X of the treaty" Article X (2) states any d ispure between an
investor and Spain, if untesolved for six months, shall be first submitted to the
43

Award of the Tribunal of November 13, 2000 , 16 [CSID REv.--FILJ 248 (2001); 5
1CSID REp. 419 (2002); 124 I.L.R. 35 (2003); There were four issues fo r the tribunal
to consider on merits o f the case:
1. Whether all acts and omissions of SODIGA were attributabl e

(0

the Kingdom of

Spain?
2. Whether SO DIGA was at fault for not est imating the cost

orthe EAMSA project

accurately and misinformed Maffezini abo ut the COStS, causing him

which is bound to fail?
3 . Whether SO OlGA coerced Maff'ezini

to

(0

take a project

make the investment before assessing the

feasibility of the project pursuant to an environmental impact assessmenc, and if the
cost of assessment caused the failure of the project
4. Whether the loan was authorized by Maffezini, and was there any irregularity?
The coun decided that SODIGA was a public emity in relation to its activities which
are not commercial. While Maffezini inherited the risk of the mvestm ents as in any
business and the consequent risks associated with the co mpliance of environ mental
laws, th e transfer of the funds was irregular and was done without the consent of
Maffezini. Accordingly, the court imposed compensation of 57,641,265 .28 Spanish

Pesetas to Maff'ezini, payable by the Kingdom of Spain.
44

Agreement for the Reciprocal Prommion and Protectio n of Investments between the

Kingdom of Spain and [he Argenrine Republi c, an. X (1991 ) (Se tdement of Disputes
Between a Contracting Parry and an Investor of the other Contracting Parry).

4. [n the cases foreseen in paragraph 3, the disputes between [he panies shall be submit[ed,
unless the parti~ mherwise agree, either to international arbitration under the March 18,
1965, Convention on the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes Between States and Natio nals
of Other States or to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal established under the Arbi tration Rules
o f the United N ations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). "
122
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courts of Spain for settlement." Pursuant to such submission to che courts of
Spain, if no decision was delivered for 18 monchs ftom the date of submission
or if che dispute continues subsequent to the delivery of a judgment by the
domestic court, the patties can submit che dispute for arbitration by ICSID
or an ad hoc tribunal established under UNCITRAL.46
Spain argued that this clause makes its consent to submit to international
arbitration conditional upon exhaustion of local remedies by che investor.
Considering the dispute between Maffezini and Spain was not submitted to a
local court for adjudication, Spain argued that Maffezini has not satisfied the
requirement of exhaustion oflocal remedies to trigger the option under Article
X (3) to approach the international arbitration tribunal ."
The court dismissed this argument of Spain on three grounds. Firstly, Spain
had not conditioned its consent under Article 26 of the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States
CICSID Convention') . The ICSID Convention requires that the requirement
of exhaustion of local remedies shall be a pre-requisite to the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal only if the consent is so conditioned at che time of ratifYing the
ICSID Convention.

45

Article 2: If the dispute cannot thus be settled within six monchs following the date on
which the dispucc has been raised by either parry. it shall be submitted co the competent
tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose rerriw ry the investment was made.

46

Article 3: The dispute may be submitted to international arbitration in any of the following
circumstances:
a) at
request of one of the parties (0 the dispute, if no decision has been rendered
on the merits of the claim after the expiration of a period of eighteen months from
the date on which the proceedings refe rred [0 in paragraph 2 of this Article have
been initiated, or if such decision has been rendered, but the dispute between the
parties continues;

me

b) ifboth parties to the dispute agree thereto.
Article 4: In the cases foreseen in paragraph 3, the disputes between the parties shall be
submitted, unless the parties' otherwise agree. either to international arbitration under
the March 18. 1965. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States or to an ad hoc arbit ral tribunal established under
the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

(UNCITRAL)."

47 Supra no te 41 at 45.
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Secondly, in relation to its consent under the Argentine-Spain BIT, the option
to approach the local courtS or a decision from the local courts pursuant ro
submission of dispute did not preclude the investor from approaching the court
but only provided an additional option to approach the 10 I courtS." Further,
all investors have a right to have any disputes under a bilateral investment treary
decided by an international tribunal despite the decisions o f the local courtS."
MFN - an Alternative Source of Jurisdiction

In addition to the above discussion, Maffezini sou rced the Tribunal's jurisdiction
through the MFN clause. The controversial argument, wh ich was welcomed
and accepted by the ICSID panel, consists of a combined reading of the MFN
clause incorporated in the Argentina-Spain BIT and the dispute settlement
clause ftom the bilateral investment treary between Chile and Spain ("ChileSpain BIT"). For the sake of clariry, the argument is presented in twO steps:
One, the MFN clause incorporated in Article IV of the Argentina- Spain BIT
reads, 'In all matters subject to this Agreement, this treatment shall not be less
fovorable than that extended by each Part;)! to the investments made in its territory
by investors ofa third country.' [emphasis provided]
Maffezini interpreted the phrase 'all matters subject to this Agreement' to
include not only the substantial subject matter of the agreement, namely
inves tments, but also procedural aspect of the agreemem, such as dispute
settlement and the cooling off period before approaching international tribunals,
on the grounds that the procedural rights enhances the qualilative enforcement
of the substantive rights.'o Spain rebutted this argument stating that 'subjectmatter' refers only to the 'material aspects of the treatment granted to the
investor.' Spain used the principles of ejusdem generis and submitted that the
MFN clause cannot be extended to matters 'not envisaged by the basic treary."l
48

~t was not a fo.rk on .the .road .clause: Further, if allowing it to be a condition, it means only
In

49
50
51

case of demal of Justice W Ill [he Investor be able to approach international arbitration.

Supra note 41 at 30.
Supra note 41 at 38-40.
Supra nO[e 41 at 4 1, 42.
124
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Two, flowing from this argument, the dispute settlement clause in Article
10(2) of the Chile-Spain BIT allows an invesror under the treaty, investing in
either of the territories, to resort to arbitration after expiry of six months of
negotiations pursuant to the dispute.
Maffezini argued that this provision on the Chile-Spain BIT places a Chilean
investor in Spain in a better position than an Argentinian investor, violating the
MFN clause in the agreements. The Chilean investor is capable of seeking faster
remedy, as he is not required to wait for 18 months to seek remedy or approach
domestic courts as a pre-requisite. Therefore, he argues that he has the same
rights and obligation as the Chilean investor as these rights are incorporated
by reference in the Argentina-Spain BIT through the MFN clause.
Spain disagreed with this argument on the basis of the principle res inter
aliosacta52 and the treaties entered into by Spain with other States should not
affect the investor under the Argentine-Spain BIT. Additionally, Spain also
insisted that the MFN clause is an anti-discrimination clause, and the claimant
should show that he has been subjected to material economic disadvantage by
complying with the requirements of the dispute settlement clause.
The Tribunal allowed Maffezini's argument and found jurisdiction for itself to
hear the matter. The reasoning of the court consisted of four prongs:
One, identifYing the 'basic treaty' and 'third party treaty' : The Tribunal follows
the premises laid down in the Anglo Iranian Oil Company CaseY A MFN
clause in the 'basic treaty' incorporates by reference the tights and obligations
in third party treaty to the beneficiaries of the basic treaty as long as they deal
with the subject matter of the basic treaty. S4 The subject matter to which the
52

Supra note 41 at 4 5,

53

Itstated that the basic treaty is the one containing the MFN clause. 1952 I.e.). Rep. 93,
109 Ouly 22)

54

The determination of the basic [reary is important because the 'subject matter' to which
the MFN clause applies is determined by this treary. If the third party treaty deals with
the same 'subject matter' and provides better treatment for the investor thereunder, rhose
rights will be incorporared in the basic treaty. Para 45 page 16 of Maffezini.

44. Res inter aliosacra is a legal principle stating that acts done
amongst others cannot alter the position between the contesting parties.
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MFN clause applies in the 'basic treaty' (Argentine-Spain BIn and the third
party (Chile-Spain BIn should be the same to be consistent with the ejusdem

generis principle. 55
Two, scope of'fair and equitable treatment': In order to determine the subject
matter of the MFN clause in the basic treaty, the Tribunal decided to enquire
into the scope of the phrase 'fair and equitable treatment.' The Tribunal referred
to the discussion by the Commission of Arbitration in the Ambatielos claims
between United Kingdom and Greece on the scope of MFN clause. The
Commission had extended the application of the MFN clause to questions in
relation to the administration of justice. 56 However, to determine if the MFN
treatment was extended to the dispute settlement clause in cases where there is
no express inclusion or exclusion of the clause, the scope should be determined
based on the intent of the parties at the time of entering i to the treaty.
Three, State practice of Spain: The Tribunal reviewed the negotiations leading
to the Argentine-Spain BIT and found that while Argentina was insistent on
including an option to approach domestic courts, Spain had supported direct
submission to international arbitration. Further, the Tribunal reviewed all the
BITs entered into by Spain and established State practice on the part of Spain
supporting submission to international arbitration, thus evidencing intention
to submit to international arbitration in case of dispute.
Four, rights of the investor: The Tribunal additionally reasoned that p rocedural
rights of the traders were seen integral for the protecti n of traders and
commercial activities previously. Extending this analogy to today, these dispute
settlement measures are equally intrinsic to the protection offoreign investors.
The Tribunal further noted that, "Traders and investors, like their States of

nationality, have traditionally felt that their rights and interests are better protected
55

Supra note 41 , , 56

56

In the Amba[ieios case, while [he couct excended <he applica[ion or MFN to adminiscra[ion
ofjus{~ce. th~ extension was relati<:>n [0 denial of justice which wC'..s a primary obligation
of Unl(~d Kingdom. The cI~'m~ taJsed by Greece did not have any procedural aspects
of the dispute settlement obligation, and, therefore, the extension by Maffez.ini has been
contested. Supra noce 15

ir:
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by recourse to international arbitration than by submission ofdisputes to domestic
courts, while the host governments have traditionally felt that the protection of
domestic courts is to be preferred. " 17

Based on me above rationale, me Tribunal found jurisdiction and decided to hear
me matter on i~ merits. The Tribunal did limit the scope of its ruling to certain
public policy restrictions. The Tribunal qualified application by identifYing four
exceptions, namely, (i) Express conditionality to consent to arbitration - If a
State has consented to be party to me arbitration subject to exhaustion oflocal
remedies, such conditionality cannot be undone by me application MFN clause. 5'
(ii) Fork in me road clauses - Inclusion of a 'fork in the road' clause by the parties
me agreement. Such a clause requires the claimant to make a choice between
litigating in domestic courts and approaching an international arbitration tribunal .
to

This forces me claimant to pick one option and, thereby, impliedly waiving the
orner.59 (iii) Choice of forum clause - If the agreement provides for a particular
arbitration forum, such a choice cannot be subsequently changed to any orher
forum referred to in the third party treaties by applying me MFN Clause. (iv)
Incorporation of a highly institutionalized system of arbitration in the agreement
- The Tribunal interpretation agreement with highly institutionalized system of
arbitration in the agreement is an indication of the intention of the contracting
parties, and none of the procedural mechanisms or requirements can be altered
by the application of MFN clause.
The Tribunal clarifies that these are merely illustrative factors, and there can
be other public policy considerations owing to which the MFN clause cannot
be applied. GO One of the criticisms posed by Martins Paparinskis in his paper
against these exceptions is that me Tribunal interpreted "all matters" so widely,
that to provide these exceptions defeats that interpretation. The limitations laid
down on me scope of the Maffezini decision by me Tribunal were taken up
57
58
59

Supra narc 14, 55.
Supra narc 14, ~ 63.
Christopher Schreuer, Travrlling rh, BIT rou"; of waiting paiods, umbrella clauJ<S and
forks in rh"oad2 JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 231-256 ( 2004): 231-256
60 Id.
12 7
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very seriously by scholars and subsequent courts to distinguish tact patterns
ftom that of Maffezini 61

DEVEWPING JURISPRUDENCE
One of the first cases to have an identical scenario as in Majfozini was Siemens
AG v. The Argentina Republic. 62 T his decision widened' the scope of Maffezini
by applying the rationale to a more nartowly phrased MFN clause in the treary
between Germany and Argentina.
Siemens A.G. , a German corporation, resorted to international arbitration to settle
its dispute with Argentina under the treary signed by Germany and Argentina.
Also, Siemens AG did not satisfY the requirement of prior submission of the
matter to the Argentinian courts. Siemens argued on the same lines as M affezini ,
drawing jurisdiction for tribunal ftom the investment treary signed between
Argentina and Chile. The key difference in facts was that the M FN clause in the
treary between Germany and Argentina did not have the bto d opening phrase,
In all matters subject to this agreement" as in the Argentina-Spain BIT.
U

The tribunal nevertheless allowed the claim of Siemens on three gtounds: (i) The
access to special dispute settlement mechanism, [i.e., arbitration) was an integral
part of the protection provided to investors and can therefore be incorporated
through the MFN clause6'; (ii) In case of the argument to ptotect speci fically
negotiated terms of the treary and its finaliry, the court stated that all specifically
negotiated terms unless excepted should be ignored by the application of the
MFN clause6'; and (iii) MFN clause is focussed on ly on securing favourable
treatments, and the claimants are not obliged to be bound by the obligations
or requirements in the third parry treaties. 6s

Gl

TecnicasMedioa mbiemalesTecmed, S.A. v. Mexico ICSID, Case no. ARB (AF)/00/02,
Award, May 29, 2003

62
G3

ICS ID Case No. ARB/02/S, Decision on Jurisdiction, Aug. 3, 2004
!d. at ~!o2

G4
65

rd. at lOG
ld at ~109
128
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This allows investors to exercise the benefits from third parry treaties without
suffering any of the obligations. In turn, the investors with lower obligations in
their native treaties will be better placed, as they will be able to get the best of
terms compared to other investors .6G Further, this diminishes the importance
of the limitations of the MFN clause identified in Maffezini award.
In the case of Bayindir Insaat Turizmv. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 67 the
Tribunal considers the regime of rights arising from treaties and rights arising
ftom contracts and restricts the scope of 'fair and equitable treatment' only in
respect to rights arising from treaties.
Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A. is a Turkish corporation engaged
in infrastructure projects such as roadways construction. It entered into a
contract with the government of Pakistan for the construction of roads.
Subsequently, a dispute arose between the parties on the timeline for the
project and whether Bayindir was breaching the deadline of completion for
the project. The government ofPakisran cancelled its contract with Bayindir
and awarded ino a local COntractor. Bayindir argued that his 'investment'"
was treated unfavourably as compared to the treatment given to the local
investor or any other third parry investor.
The claim for MFN in this case arises from Article II (2) of the Turkey-Pakistan
BIT. This clause encompassed both an obligation to provide national treatment

66

Su aiso, Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcdona,
S.A., and Inter Aguas Servicios Integrales del Agua. S.A. v. The Argentine Republic
ICSID Case No.ARB/03/17. In this case, the fact panern was similar to Maff"ezini and
Siemens and the MFN clause started with the phrase "in all maners." The investment
treaty involved contained a lisl of exceptions [0 the application of the MFN crcarment.
Argemina argued that while the list did not camain dispute resolution, by the application
of qusde-m gro(ris principle to the items in the list, dispute setdemem provisions should be
excluded. The tribunal. however, rejected this argument and stated that, in the existence
of an express list of exceptions. all matters not included in the list will be within me scope
of the M FN clause.

67 ICSID Decision o n Jurisdiction Case No. ARB/03/29 (Nov. 14, 2005).SugrneraUy, Akin

68

AJcitepe and Ronan J. McHug. Bayindir v. Pakistan and thr Drclint and Fall oflnvrstnunt
Tr(Qty C/;,ims on Inurnational Construction Projre" 6(2) ANKARA LAw REVIEW 83-106
(Winter 2009).
For the tribunal's discussion on definition of investment, please sec paragraphs 104 - 130
of the decision.
129
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and a most favoured nation treatment to Turkish investors. For the purposes of
jurisdiction, the tribunal held that a prima facie case has been made by Bayindir
showing existence of differential treatment between the claimant and others.6'
Further, by using the MFN clause in the Turkey-Pakistan BIT, the tribunal
imported an obligation for Pakistan to ensure fair and equitable treatment of
the investments by Turkish nationals even though the Turkey-Pakistan BIT did
not contain a "fair and equitable treatment" clause.'o While considering the
matter on merits, the tribunal states that, "The ordinary meaning of the words
used in Article 11(2), together with the limitations provided in Article 11(4), show

that the parties to the Treaty did not intend to exclude the importation of a more
favourable substantive standard oftreatment accorded to investor.' ofthird countries.
This reading is supported by the preamble's insistence on FET."" The content of
this 'fair and equitable treatment' standard was drawn by the Tribunal from
customary international law and decisions of other tribunals."
The Tribunal in Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite
Kingdom ofJordan" distinguished the fact pattern ftom Maffezini , attempting
to make that opinion an exception to the rule. Two Italian companies were
involved in a project for construction of dams in Jordan. T he dispute is in
relation to the amount of money owed by Jordan to the claimant companies.
The claimant companies entered into a COntract with the government ofJordan
for the purposes of the project, and dispute has arisen pursuant to the contract.
Similar to Maffezini, the jurisdiction ofICSID was challenged in this case, and
the claimant companies' resorted to the jurisdiction granted ro the tribunal

69

Supra note 67 'I 206 - "The mm foct that Bayindir had always bun subj<et to ""actly the

sam~

uga! and regulatory fram~ork as ronyhody elS( in Pakistan does not necessarily mean
that it was actually treaud in the same way as local (or third (ountritf) immtors. In other

words, as isevidmt from the broad wording ofArtick JJ(2) 54 ofthe BIT, the lTeatment the
investor is offirtd untkr the MFN cfaUst is not limiud to 'regulatory /rt'atmmt"'

70
71
72

Supra note 67 ~~227-235.
ICSID Award Case No.ARB/03129 (Aug.27. 2009) 157.
/d. ~ 176-182; These facrors include the obligation to maintain a stable framework for
Invcsrmems, transparency. due process. refrain from arbitrary dec sians and coercive
tactics and meet reasonable expectations of the investors.

73

ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. Decision on Jurisdiction. Nov. 29. 2004.
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under bilateral investment treaty for their claims. While the contraCt contains
a separate dispute resolution procedure, the claimants argue that the ICSID
tribunal has jurisdiction ro hear the matter on multiple grounds."
One of these grounds is that MFN clause in the bilateral investment treaty
signed by the twO States in 1996. Considering the Jordan-USA BIT as a third
party treaty, the investor under the Jordan-Italy treaty can invoke the dispute
settlement procedure allowing jurisdiction to ICSID. Jordan contested that the
basis of the claims are contractual and, therefore, ICSID does not trigger the
MFN clause in the Jordan-Italy BIT. The court narrowed down the issue to
"whether Article 3(1) a/the BIT (most favoured nation clause) gives jurisdiction
to the Tribunal in particular with respect to contractual claims. " 75

The tribunal analysed the c1ause 76 and distinguished it from those in the
Ambatielos case and Maffezini case. The Tribunal ruled that the approach in
Ambatielos was to invoke some of the substantive provisions from the BIT
between UK and other countries and not to invoke the application of the entire
dispute settlement clause. It next went on to distinguish the present situation

74

The ocher [WQ grounds raised by the claimants are:
1.

2.

Arricle 25(1) of rhe ICSID convemion [0 which Jordan and haly are borh conseming
panies through the dispute resolution clause in the BIT. They further argue that the
MFN clause in [he rreacy overrides the dispute resolution clause in the cont racts;
The second conremion by the claimants is that assuming the dispute resolution
clause is not overridden by the BIT, the claims in the present case arc in relation to
the rights of investors under the BIT and not the rights of the parties to the contrac[.

75 Supra nore 73 69.
76

Arricles 3(1) and (2) of che BIT read as follows:
1. Bmh Contracting Parties , within the bounds of their own territory, shall grant
investments effected by, and the income accruing to, investors of [he mher Comracting
Party no less favorable trtatmem than that accorded to investments effected by, and
income accruing to , its own nationals or investOrs of Third States.
2. In case, from the legislation of one of the Comracting Parties, or from the international
obligations in force or that may come into force in the future for one of the Contracting
Parties, should come out a legal framework according to which the investors of the
other Contracting Parry would be granted a more favorable treatment than the one
foreseen in this Agreement, the treatment granted to the investors of such other Parties

will apply also foe oursranding celacionships.
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from the Maffezini decision?? The MFN clause in the present case is not as
broad as those encountered in the Maffezini case. Also, it cannot be evidenced
that Jordan and Italy intended to include dispute settlement in the MFN
clause.78 This ruling limited the application ofMaffezini opin ion to th is extent.
Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria" was the first case which
categorically deviates from Maffezini and follows the spark ignited by the Salini
court. Plama Consortium Limited (PCL) was a Cypriot company investing
in the capital of a State-owned company, Bulgarian company Nova Plama
AD, which owned a local oil refinery through a share purchase agreement. so
While the case on merits was in relation to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),
at the preliminary stage, the claimant sought the MFN clau. e in the bilateral
investment treaty between Cyprus and Bulgaria as a source of jurisdiction for
ICSID81 in the event the tribunal denies any jurisdiction u der the dispute
settlement clause in ECT.

In responding to the claimant's argument of importing jurisdiction fro m a third
party treaty through the MFN clause, the court focuses on the interpretation
of the MFN clause. Firstly, the Tribunal interpreted the scope of 'treatment'
in the MFN provision in the light of the article itself. In this BIT, the second
paragraph of the MFN clause guides the scope of the MFN treatment with
a list of exceptions where MFN treatment will not be applicable. The court
pondered on the possib ility of interpreting this list of exceptions to implicitly
77

h also included a word of caution in relation to the difficulty in applying the exceptions
identified by the Maffezini CO Urt , especially considering that the language in the bilateral
treaties are varied.

78 This ruling conAiccs with the inherem right of investors to approach imcrnarional tribunal
as part of the pcorcction offered co them under international investment law, as idenri fled
in Maffezini and assencd in Gas Natural.

79
80

lCS ID Case No. ARB/03104, Decision on Jurisdiction, Feb. 8, 2005 .
Id.

81

Id. at 183 "The mechanism for arriving at that conclusion is, according [0 the Claimant,
the following: (a) the Claimant qualifies as an investor under the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT;
(b) the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT contains an MFN provision; (e) the MFN provision in the
Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT applies

to

all aspects of' treatment"; and (d) "treat ment" covers

settlement of di~pu[es provisions in other BITs to which Bulgaria is a Contracting Parry.

In char conneC[lon, the Claimant relies. inter alia, on the Bulgaria-Fililand BIT. "
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allow all other aspects in the scope ofMFN. However, it restricted this view by
highlighting the use of the word 'privileges' in the exception clause. It, therefore,
interpreted that the MFN clause was intended to apply as privileges only to
substantive rights, and not all rights under treary." Since the claimant has no
evidence of negotiating history to interpret otherwise, the Court retained its
restrictive interprerarion. 83
The second leg of reasoning arises from the Claimants' reliance on the object
and purposes of the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT, Report of the Executive Direcrors
on the ICSID Convention of 1965, UNCTAD's study "Bilateral Investment
Treaties in the Mid-1990s" and the Maffezini judgment, all of which recognising
international arbitration and similar dispute settlement mechanisms to be
intrinsically part of the protective rights offered to investors in foreign States.
While agreeing with the existence and the utiliry ofsuch right, the courts reject this
teleological interpretation as "legally insufficient" to expand the scope ofMFN."
International arbitration has significantly replaced the diplomatic protection
mechanism sought by home States for their investors abroad. The court
clarifies that this development has not replaced the fundamental requirement
of clear and unambiguous agreement berween the parties to arbitrate. While
this agreement is in-built into the investment treaties through the dispute
settlement clause, the court requires explicit acceptance to extend the MFN
clause to dispute settlement.'s It analysed the negotiations and State practices
of Cyprus and Bulgaria and found no evidence of any intention to support
the Claimant's argument. The court observed that "a reference may in and of
itselfnot be sufficient; the reforence is required to be such as to make the arbitration
clause part ofthe contract. "85

82

This seems to be arbitrary, as the Court does not provide any rule of interpretation for
restricting the scope of the clause based on the usage of 'privilege' to substantive rights.

83

!d. at ~ 192

84
85

Jd.at,193

Id at

218

86 Supra note 79 , 200
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The Plama court then proceeds ro analyse the Maffezini decision in greater
detail. The COUrt observed that parties ro a particular BIT intend ro settle
disputes in the manner provided for in the agreement. Therefore, subjecting
them ro dispute settlement procedures from other treaties would require their
express consent and cannot be presumed. Further, the referenc<: by incorporation
can allow only 'favorable treatment,' which imposes a butden on the court ro
determine what is more favorable. 87
The court slams the Maffezini approach as replacing a procedure agreed ro by the
parties ro the BIT which is not the same as incorporating a £Ivorable treatment.
While the latter is consistent with the function of the MFN clause, the former
is objectionable." The court concludes by declaring Maffezini fact pattern as
unique" and that such an approach should be followed by tribunals only when
such exceptional £Ict scenario exists, instead of making it a general principle
oflaw. It rephrases the Maffezini principle as follows : "an MFN provision in a
basic treaty does not incorporate by reforence dispute settlement provisions in whole
or in part set forth in another treaty. unless the MFN provision in the basic treaty
leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them."90
This decision was followed in a number of decisions including Vladimir
Berschader and Moise Berschader v. The Russian Federation! ! Telenor Mobile
87

Supra 79." 208 "The Claimant argues that it is obviously more favorable for the investor
to have a choice among different dispute resolution mechanisms, a d to have the entire
dispute resolved by arbitration as proVIded in the Bulgaria-Finland Bn: than to be confined
to ad hoc arbitration limited to the quantum of compensation for expropriation. The

Tribunal is inclined

to

agree with the Claimant that, in this particular case, a choice is

better than no choice. Bur, what if one BIT provides for UNC ITRAL arbitratio n and

another provides for ICSID? Which is more favorable?"
88

Supra note 79,
209-212; "When concluding a multilateral or bilateral investment ueaty
with specific dispute resolution provisions, states cannot be expected co leave those provisions
to future (partial) replacement by different dispute resolution provisions through the operation
of an MFN provision, unless the States have e:xplicicly agreed thereto (as in the case of BITs
based on the UK Model B(1). This matter can also be viewed as forming pan of the generally
accepted principle, nowadaY', of the separability (autonomy) of the arliItration clause."

89

Th~ requir~ment imposed?n the investors in the Maffezini fact pattern, prior to approach

to International arbitral tnbunals, was vague and unprecedented in the opinion of the
Plama court.
90

Supra note 79,

223

91

Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Case No. 08012005,
Award of April 21, 2006
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Communications A.S. v. The Republic of HungarY2 and National Grid PLC v.
Argentine Republic93

ILC'S ROLE IN THE MAZE
The ambiguity in the development of jurisprudence on MFN clause has caused
the ILC to react. Rohan Perero, in his working paper, identified the ques tion
faced by the States, in light of these diverging developments of jurisprudence,
is "whether it could be determined in advance, with any degree ofcertainty. what
obligations a State has in fact undertaken when it includes a MFN clause" in the
treaty.94 He states that the MFN is very much a part of public international
law and proposes that ILC should study "the role and function ofMFN clauses
and of their relationship to the principle of non-discrimination in international
law,"95

In fa ct, regional organisations and states reacting to the Maffezini tribunal's
elaboration of the scope of MFN clause included express exclusion of dispute
settlement provisions ftom the scope of the MFN clause. For instance, the
court in Plama decision highlights that "specific exclusion in the draft FTAA

is the result of a reaction by States to the expansive interpretation made in the
MajJezini case. ''''The courts also highlight that the interpretation allowing such
a broad expansion vitiated the consent of the States since they would not have
consented to the inclusion of these rights expressly, and hence incorporation
by reference is outside the scope of their consent. 97 In addition, invesrors have
been resorting to treaty-shopping by picking favorable rights from various
treaties. This would defeat the purpose of treaty law." A treaty when read in

92
93
94

95
96
97
98

ICS ID Case No. ARB/04/15, Sept. 13,2006
UNCITRAL, D«ision on Jurisdiction. 92 Uune 20. 2006)
UN GENERAL AsSEMBLY, REpORT Of THE ILC ON THE WORK
390-401 (2008).
Id. at 400
Supra note 79 at 200-203.
Supra no te 79.
Supra note 15.
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totality attempts to balance out the rights and obligations of all parties ro the
treaty. A right incorporated in Article A may be balanced out by an obligation
incorporated in Article Z. The investors by cherry-picking their rights without
considering the corresponding obligations are in a position of unfai r advantage
against the State parties.""
Looking at the big picture, the commentaty on Article 5 identifies the peculiarity
about the MFN clause. 100 It states that while the obligations a.re entered into by
the State parties, the benefits are enjoyed and claimed by individuals in those
territories. With the increase in the number of interactions between individuals
and States, the scope of MFN is bound to expand at the same rate as the rate
of increase in the number of BITs. Each varying fact pattern will generate a
different interpretation of the clause. For instance, in White Industries Australia
Limitedv. The Republic o/India, 101 while White Industries did not source the
tribunal's jurisdiction from the MFN clause, it sourced the obl igation ofIndia to
provide "effective means" to resolve claims to its investors fro the BIT between
the State of Kuwait and the Republic of India into the Agreement between
Government ofAustralia and the Government of the Republic ofIndia on the
Promotion and Protection of Investments dated February G, 1999 (AustraliaIndia BIT) using the Maffezini rationale. 102 India protested t is interpretation
on the grounds that the terms of the Australia-India BIT we re intact and that
the application of national law was expressly agreed upon by both parties. The
Tribunal accepted White's positions stating that, by accepting the incorporation
of the effective means standard from the India-Kuwait BIT, the aim of the MFN
clause incorporated in the Australia-India BIT only strengthened. Further,
such incorporation would not prevent or contradict the application of the
domestic laws ofIndia. Therefore, the Tribunal held India t be breaching its
obligations under the M FN clause of Australia-India BIT by not meeting the
standards laid down in the effective means clause of the Kuwait-India BIT.
99

Supra note 24 at 40.

100 Draft Articles on the most favoured nation clause, art. 5; Supra not(' 4 at 21 .

101 UNCITRAL, Final Award (Nov. 3D, 2011)
102 Jd at 4.4

Most Favo ured Nation Clause: MaJfezini and International Law Commission

The implications of this interpretation have ramifications, which may not be
foreseen by governments at the start of an investment transaction, thus shifting
the balance greatly in favour of the investors.
There are primarily two questions that need to be answered in this regard
by the international community: Firstly, what is the basis of the right to a
'most favoured nation' treatment? Second, what is the scope of this right?
The confusion arises when using the MFN clause in the treaties as the source
of answer for both questions. The question is whether the MFN clause in a
treaty is a primary rule or a secondary rule. This will determine if it should be
interpreted as a primary rule which is the basis for the right to most favorable
treatment, or a secondary rule defining the scope of granting such treatment.
There are multiple views on how to interpret MFN clauses favouring both
inclusion and exclusion of dispute settlement clause. 10' These diverse views
have created inconsistency in interpretation which affects the investment
regime both within a particular tribunal and across tribunals . For instance,
the ICSID tribunal in Gas Naturalv. Argentina rejected the argument that the
IS-months waiting period was a "public policy rule," whereas the UNCITAL
tribunal in National Grid v. Argentina accepted that some claimants had tried
to use the MFN clause "beyond reasonable limits.""" In light of the number of
opinions floating, the issue to be resolved by ILC is the unfettered development
of international law and, specifically, the investment law regime.

•

In the report of the ILC on the Fragmentation of International Law, the
Commission observes that, "In order for the new law to be efficient, it often includes
new types o[treaty clauses or practices that may not be compatible with oldgeneral law
or the law o[some other specialized branch. Very often new rilles or regimes devewp

I

103 Yannick Radi. The Application ofthe Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to the Dispute Smkment
Provisions of Bilateral lnvestmmt TrMties: Domesticating the 'Trojan Horu' 18(4) THE
EUROPEAN JO URNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw. (2007) The article discusses possibility of
resolving the confusion owing to the MFN clause by the application of the principle of
4ftt utik and argues that, for the purpose of effectiveness, the MFN clause should always
be interpreted to include dispute setdement clauses unless expressly excluded.
104 Su also, Vladimir Berschader and Moise Berschader v. The Russian Federation , Arbitration
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. Case No. 080/2005, Award. 21 April
2006.
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precisely in order to deviate from what was earlier provided by the general law. When
such deviations become general and frequent, the unity o/the law suffers."10'
The aim of the ILC in reopening the topic of MFN is to safeguard against
fragmentations and stress on coherence in the investment law regIme. It is difficult to
ignore the common shift in the objective ofILC by taking up these topics. If the
concern was merely of codification and progressive development, the divergences
pursuant ro interpretation would have been anticipated. However, the present
concern ofILC seems ro be uniformiry and integriry of international legal order.
Article 15 of the Statute of the International Law Commissio clarifies the scope
of the codification and progressive development. The ILC, while considering
the MFN treatment in the last round, has codified the law inro draft articles.
Having clarified that it will not reopen or update the previous set of draft
articles, the scope of work for ILC is limited.
One solution to determine the scope of ILC's work could be re-considering
the issue specifically in light of the developing diversiry in all regimes. This
present regime ofMFN is a micro form of the larger problem of fragmentation
taken up as ropic by the ILC. In the working paper on fragmentation the ILC
identifies the limitations on codifYing a topic such as fragmentati on whose
inherent essence is to retain its uncertainry. '06 In conclusion, the ILC decided to
consider the option of'restatement' as a product to work rowards fo r the ropic
of fragmentation. It clarifies that the decision to draft restatements does not
imply expansion of its scope or conflict with the other func tions of ILC. This
avenue of work is a supplement ro the function of progressive development. 107
They identifY key areas of focus for restatements to be sources, forms taken
by general international law and the impact of codification and progressive
develo pment on the operation of general international law.

105 UN

GENERAL AsSEMBLY, REpORT OF THE STUDY GROUP OF THE INTERNATI ONAL
m
C OMMISSION, 58 session (l May-9 June and 3 July-II August 2006) at page 14
Doc NO. AfCN A/L.682.

106 !d. at 25-28.
107 !d at 256.
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Considering the objective of ILC as stated in the report of the ILC, it is a
plausible avenue for the ILC ro adopt a similar approach without exceeding
its scope. By exploring the option of restatements, it can generate additional
literature without reiterating or contradicting the Draft Article of 1978, while
retaining its flexibility ro clarifY and modifY the present conundrum. Also,
restatements will inherently not require the consent of the Member States but
merely act as guidelines for future practice by the international community.
The scope of this restatement could be multi-faceted. It could record the
evolution of the MFN clause and the present discrepancy in a coherent manner.
There could be a suggestion of a model clause for future use. ILC can produce
a soft law instrument clarifYing the confusion and laying down rules ro be
followed for a valid MFN clause. Each of these approaches varies in the degree
of conclusiveness they will provide for the ropic. However, the ILC should keep
in mind the changes that have taken place in the international legal order since
1978, which raise potential caution points for the reconsiderations of the topic.
Firstly, the interpretation and jurisprudence ofMFN by the dispute settlement
body of the World Trade Organisation - in addition ro trade agreement,
there are variations of the MFN clause used in individuals in their contracts
with foreign cusromers, traders or licensees. The ILC should be aware of the
position in other regimes and attempt ro provide a hierarchy amongst these.
The conflict resolution technique of lex specialis will be less helpful as each of
these is a specific area of law.
Secondly, the ILC is also considering drafting a model clause for bilateral
investment treaty. This solution will have two primary obstacles. The model
clause, while it can act as a guideline for bilateral investment treaties, fails in case
of multilateral treaties where the parties are numerous and the bargaining power
of the parties will be very different from that of a bilateral treaty. Secondly, the
issue presently is in relation ro interpretation of the MFN clause. The model
clause suggested, which the ILC proposes will have ro avoid any ambiguous
terms which can generate diverse interpretation such as "subject matter," "all"
or "any." Further, the States entering into such treaties are bound ro make
fact-specific alterations ro the suggested model clause.
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Alternatively, the ILC will have to ptovide clear definit ions and rules of
interpretation for the model clause. It will, however, impose the impossible task
of ILC anticipating all possible variations of the model cla se and providing
adequate interpretative guidelines for each. Both of mese would imply the ILC
playing the role of a judiciary or a legislature. Further, responding to judicial
opinions from various tribunals to correct any deviations may require ILC ro
have me power of judicial review over those tribunals. This is too bu rdensome
and impossible a task for me objectives of ILC.
Since the 1978 Draft Article on MFN already exists, me ILC can not propose
international convention on most favoured nation treatment. T his will also
overlap with me MFN obligation under me GATT. The [LC can consider
proposing a model clause only for investment treaties, but m is would generate
further fragmentation, conflicting with the objective of ILC.
CONCLUSION
Based on me above discussion, it is opined that the most feasible option for
me ILC is to produce a restatement oflaws. Since me ILC plans to take up the
exercise under fragmentation, for the purposes of convenience and coherence,
it would be more beneficial to include the ropic ofMFN as a part of the topic
of fragmentation of international law.
The regime ofMFN is a difficult one. The hope is ro generate equaliry without
promoting favouritism. The rough task for me States is ro revaluate me MFN
clause in each treary with all omer treaties to ensure there are no gaps for
discriminarory treatment.
The courts have a higher prioriry ro protect investors than to ensure coherence in
me decisions. While me Maffezini decision makes a very convincing argument,
as stared in Salini and Plama, it should be treated as an exception and not as
a rule. It is important for COUrts ro foresee the consequence of endorsing of
generalizing legal principles ro ensure mat, in the eagerness to protect the
plaintiffbefore mem, mey do not disadvantage stakeholders all across me globe.
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The task for ILC is a challenging one. In its 198 1 report, UNITAR claimed that
ILC is fust losing its relevance as the law maker due to the escalating number
of smal ler law-making organisations which are regime specific. 109 The ILC has
been presented with an opportunity to redeem its purpose with a topic such as
MFN . In the event ILC successfully resolves the conflict, the new form ofILC
will be able to survive a longer life in the international legal order.

Th~ Inurnational Law Commission: The Nud for a New Dirution (Policy
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